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OVERCOMING DEADLOCK: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL 
REASONS TO EMBRACE THE EXTENDED MIND THESIS
ABSTRACT
The extended mind thesis maintains that while minds may be centrally 
located in one’s brain-and-body, they are sometimes partly constituted 
by tools in our environment. Critics argue that we have no reason to 
move from the claim that cognition is embedded in the environment to 
the stronger claim that cognition can be constituted by the environment. 
I will argue that there are normative reasons, both scientific and ethical, 
for preferring the extended account of the mind to the rival embedded 
account.
1. Introduction
Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s extended mind thesis maintains that while minds 
are centrally located in one’s brain-and-body they are sometimes partly constitut-
ed by tools in our environment. Some critics argue that we have no reason to move 
from the claim that cognition is embedded in the environment to the stronger claim 
that cognition can actually be constituted by the environment. In this paper I argue 
there are normative reasons, both scientific and ethical, for preferring the extend-
ed view to the embedded view. In the first place I appeal to the scientific values of 
simplicity, usefulness, and explanatory power, to argue that our best scientific the-
ory of the mind will include extended mental states. In the second place, reviewing 
the literature, I appeal to three ethical reasons to prefer the extended view: it better 
protects against harm to the mind Levy (2007a,b); it better accounts for compensa-
tory rehabilitation as a way of repairing the mind (Drayson and Clark, forthcoming); 
and it offers a better assessment of the capacities of learning disabled individuals 
(King 2016). All of these reasons, especially taken together, I argue provide some 
support for preferring the extended mind thesis to the rival embedded mind thesis.
2. Clark and Chalmers’s Extended Mind Thesis
The dominant view in the brain sciences is that the brain alone constitutes, or re-
alizes, the mind. But several philosophers have argued that the mind is sometimes 
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partially constituted by more than just the brain. While this idea has long roots 
in philosophy (Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and John Dewey have 
all defended versions of this claim, for example), various contemporary philoso-
phers have given new life to the idea, often under the title of cognitive extension 
or the extended mind thesis. In this paper I will focus on one particular version 
of this claim: the “extended mind” thesis as defended by Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998). Clark explains, “[p]roponents of the extended mind story hold 
that even quite familiar human mental states (e.g., states of believing that so and 
so) can be realized, in part, by structures and processes located outside the human 
head.” (Clark 2008: 76) In other words, the extended mind thesis maintains that 
mental states (and processes) sometimes extend beyond the brain in the sense that 
they are partially constituted by extra-bodily states (or processes) working togeth-
er with brain states (or processes). 
To defend the extended mind thesis Clark and Chalmers argue, 
[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were 
it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cog-
nitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive pro-
cess. (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8) 
This is now often referred to as their ‘parity principle’, while others call it the 
‘fair treatment principle’ (e.g. Sprevak 2009; Drayson 2010) as it maintains that we 
should regard equivalent processes in similar ways, irrespective of whether they 
are internal or external to the skull. Motivated by this principle, their parity argu-
ment can be summarized:
(P1)  A physical state (or content-bearing structure) p is constitutive of a mental state 
of type m when p plays the causal role characteristic of m in the system.
(P2)   A physical state (or content-bearing structure) p located beyond (or partially be-
yond) an agent’s biological body can play the same causal role as physical states 
of the biological body that surely constitute an ordinary mental state of type m.
(C)  Therefore, physical states (or content-bearing structures) located beyond (or par-
tially beyond) the biological body can be constitutive of an agent’s mental state.
The first premise expresses a commitment to a coarse-grained common-sense 
role functionalism.1 To support the second premise, Clark and Chalmers describe a 
case in which, they argue, an object in the environment does play exactly the same 
role for one agent that neurons in the brain (something we would surely count as 
part of the supervenience or realization base of the mind) do for another. The case 
involves two people: Inga and Otto. Inga decides to go to an exhibition at the muse-
um and to do so, “[s]he thinks for a moment and recalls that the museum is on 53rd 
Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum.” (Clark and Chalm-
ers 1998: 12) Meanwhile, we imagine that Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease 
and has to rely on information he stores in a notebook to help structure his life. 
When he decides to go to the same exhibition he consults his notebook, where he 
1  For the sake of brevity I will bypass an explanation of what this view maintains exactly. 
It is a popular, though not uncontroversial, view in contemporary analytic philosophy of 
mind.
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has written the address and directions for how to get there. He then walks to the 
museum and heads inside (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 12–13). Clark and Chalmers 
argue that in the “relevant respects” the information in Otto’s notebook “functions 
just like” the information in Inga’s brain that constitutes an ordinary belief and 
thus both should count equally as part of the constitutive machinery of his mind 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998: 13). In other words, the information stored in the note-
book  really is a part of Otto’s mind, just like the information stored in Inga’s brain 
really is a part of her mind. More specifically, the information in the notebook is 
meant to be an example of an extended standing (i.e. not currently being enter-
tained), non-conscious belief. 
3. The Coupling-Constitution Objection
Importantly, the claim made by extended mind theorists is a constitutive one – 
that mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located be-
yond the brain and body. One of the major objections confronting the extended 
mind thesis maintains that we have no reason to move from the claim that cogni-
tion is causally reliant on the environment to the claim that cognition is partially 
constituted by the environment. Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa argue that 
Clark and Chalmers commit a coupling-constitution fallacy by mistaking the mere 
causal dependence, or coupling, of extra-neural resources with neural activity for 
their constitutive involvement in unconscious mental states (or processes), such as 
Otto’s belief about the location of the museum.2 Adams and Aizawa maintain that 
the mere coupling of a resource to a system does not imply the resource is partial-
ly constitutive of that system. The circulatory system is coupled to the cognitive 
system in the sense that circulation causally supports cognition in a crucial way, 
but this does not imply that circulation is partially constitutive of cognition (Ad-
ams and Aizawa, 2008: 10–11). Thus, to say that an object, x, is coupled to anoth-
er, y, does not imply that x constitutes (or is a part of y). So to show that external 
objects are coupled to our cognitive states or processes does not imply that these 
partially constitute our cognition. 
3.1 The Embedded Mind Thesis
The distinction between the mere coupling of inner and outer resources and the 
constitutive involvement of outer resources is what distinguishes the embedded the-
ory of cognition from the stronger extended mind theory. The embedded account 
maintains that a cognitive system depends, sometimes crucially, on the complexity 
of its environment, but that the environment is not an actual part of the mind. Her-
bert Simon, for example, argues that much of the apparent complexity of cognitive 
systems is actually external to the agent, residing in the environment. On this view 
cognitive systems lean heavily on this worldly complexity without internalizing 
it (Simon 1969: 51–52). For example humans sometimes structure their own envi-
ronment to store information and then rely on these external structures instead of 
2  See Adams and Aizawa (2001), (2008). 
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relying on internal resources. The mise en place method of lining up one’s ingredi-
ents in the correct order for cooking, for instance, is widely used by chefs to save 
them from having to remember the ordering of their recipes while cooking (Clark 
2008). The embedded view of cognition tells us that in order to understand and 
explain cognitive processes, such as the chef’s use and processing of information 
while cooking, cognitive science cannot just study the internal processes of com-
putation instantiated in the brain. Instead, we must study the way that structures 
in the local environment of an agent facilitate the success of the agent’s internal 
processes. Thus, the embedded view offers an explanatory, or epistemic, reason to 
look beyond the brain. But the embedded view does not make any substantial con-
stitutive claim; it does not challenge the (metaphysical) view that the brain wholly 
constitutes the mind (see Rowlands 2010, Chapter three for further discussion). 
Let us call this position, i.e. the view that the brain wholly constitutes the mind, 
‘intracranialism’. The key difference then is that embedded mind theorists accept 
intracranialism, while extended mind theorists reject it.
Extended mind theorists tend to think that embedded claims risk triviality. Al-
most everyone agrees that the mind is in some sense causally reliant on the body 
and the extra-bodily world. Many even agree that the body and tools in our envi-
ronment can work as scaffolds, causally contributing to the development of cer-
tain higher-level cognitive capacities or the execution of cognitive tasks, such that 
these capacities or tasks would not have developed or could not be executed (or 
may not even confront the agent in the first place) were it not for these extra-cra-
nial contributions. This view about ‘cognitive scaffolding’ was advocated by the 
developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1978). But scaffolding falls short of the 
constitutive claim that the extended mind thesis makes (for more on this issue see 
Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2008; Shapiro 2008; Clark 2008, 2010).
Those who prefer the embedded mind theory, on the other hand, tend to think 
that there is no good reason for preferring the stronger constitutive claim made 
by the extended mind thesis to the more conservative coupling claim. In response 
to Adam and Aizawa’s coupling-constitution objection, Clark (2010) argues that 
the burden of proof lies with those who reject the constitutive claim. They need 
a principled reason for maintaining that all mental states are entirely constituted 
by neural resources and only causally supported by extra-neural ones. To this end 
that Adams and Aizawa (2005) argue that original, or non-derived, content is the 
distinguishing ‘mark of the cognitive. Original, or non-derived, content is meant 
to contrast with the derived content that non-mental objects can display. So, while 
non-mental objects, such as the words in a book, e.g. Otto’s notebook, may carry 
derived content, original content is uniquely a feature of minds.3 Thus, Adams and 
Aizawa argue that the notebook fails to be partially constitutive of Otto’s mind be-
cause it lacks this ‘mark of the mental’ that — just as a matter of current contingent 
fact, on their view — only brains can realize.4
3  This distinction seems to be inspired by a distinction between derived and original in-
tentionality made by Searle (1992).
4  I will not respond to Adams and Aizawa’s objection here, thought I believe there are 
several responses one could give (for some responses see Clark 2008b, 2010). Notice that 
even if the objection works against the example of Otto and his notebook, their distinction 
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But some who reject the extended mind theory have also rejected Clark’s insis-
tence that the burden of proof lies with them. What reasons do we have for prefer-
ring the more radical idea that technology, such as pens and papers and even smart 
phones, can really be partly constitutive of our mental life? Rupert (2004), for ex-
ample, argues that there is no obvious reason for preferring the extended account. 
He argues, first, that adopting the embedded account is enough to recognize the 
indispensability of studying an agent’s environment for understanding his cogni-
tion without conceding that the environment is actually partially constitutive of 
cognition. Furthermore, Rupert argues that we can explain all of the relevant phe-
nomena that cognitive scientists study with the embedded account and, thus, mov-
ing to the stronger extended account is unjustified and unnecessary (Rupert 2004: 
8–9). If the extended account does not offer us anything more than the embedded 
account, then following the methodological principle of conservatism, Rupert ar-
gues, we should endorse the embedded view over the extended mind view (Rupert 
2004: 9). In this case, those defending the more radical extended view need to jus-
tify their proposed revision of our common-sense views about where the mind is.5 
Since this debate took off, several normative reasons for preferring the extended 
account over the rival embedded account have been suggested. I will now survey 
and evaluate these reasons as well as offer my own.
4. Scientific Virtues in Theory Selection
Thomas Kuhn (1977: 321–323) identifies several virtues or preferable characteris-
tics that provide the basis for choice between competing scientific theories. These 
include accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. Kuhn thinks 
that accuracy is the most important of these virtues, but we’ve seen that there is 
currently a stalemate in the debate between which view—embedded or extend-
ed—is accurate. Thus, I will make the case that by appealing to other scientific 
values, including simplicity, usefulness and explanatory power, we are compelled 
to prefer the extended account to the embedded account. While not identified by 
Kuhn, usefulness and explanatory power are arguably accepted scientific virtues 
(especially the latter), and should be distinguished from Kuhn’s other virtues, such 
as simplicity and fruitfulness, as they will sometimes be traded off against them. 
4.1 Simplicity in Theory Selection
Simplicity is widely accepted as a norm of theory formulation in a wide range of 
disciplines, both humanistic and scientific. Occam’s razor, for example, has long 
would not block all possible cases of extension. We can imagine that instead of using a 
notebook Otto uses the mind of another agent, e.g. his long-time partner, to store the in-
formation that forms his beliefs. In this case the external resource is itself a brain, so it 
would be capable of original content. The result would be an instance of a socially extended 
mind — where one agent’s mind has extended into another’s brain (‘social’ because two 
agents are involved).
5  Especially since Clark and Chalmers’ argument appeals to a version of ‘common-sense’ 
functionalism.
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been employed by philosophers as a way of guiding our preferences when choos-
ing between two competing hypotheses. This principle maintains that, in the case 
where all other things are equal, for example, where both hypotheses can account 
equally as well for the data, we ought to opt for the simplest hypothesis, that is, 
the one that posits the fewest metaphysical entities. With respect to competing 
theories about where the supervenience base of the mind is, Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) suggest that we can use simplicity as a way of assessing and arbitrating be-
tween the extended view and the embedded view.
One reason folk psychology has endured is, quite plausibly, its simplicity (it of 
course also has other virtues, including explanatory power, which I discuss below). 
The belief-desire-intention (BDI) model of our practical reasoning, developed by 
Michael Bratman (1987), is a way of explaining how we perform everyday actions. 
It is also an example of the method we commonly use in explaining the actions of 
others in everyday life, which relies, fundamentally, on folk-psychological concepts. 
Clark and Chalmers use this model to argue that the extended account yields the 
simplest explanation of Otto’s action:
Certainly insofar as beliefs and desires are characterized by their explanatory roles, 
Otto’s and Inga’s cases seem to be on a par: the essential causal dynamics of the two 
cases mirror each other precisely. We are happy to explain Inga’s action in terms of 
her occurrent desire to go to the museum and her standing belief that the museum 
is on 53rd street, and we should be happy to explain Otto’s action in the same way. 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998: 13)
In fact, according to the BDI model, we would explain Inga’s action in terms 
of her occurrent desire to go to the museum, her standing belief about where the 
museum is located and her intention to take action. The extended mind thesis al-
lows for the simplest application of the BDI model to Otto: we would explain Ot-
to’s action in terms of his occurrent desire to go to the museum, his standing belief 
about where the museum is located—which happens to be stored in his notebook, 
instead of in his brain—and his intention to take action. Thus, the extended view 
of the mind allows for the simplest application of the BDI model, a method of folk 
psychology that we regularly use. Consider the alternative explanation, as Clark 
and Chalmers describe it:
The alternative is to explain Otto’s action in terms of his occurrent desire to go to the 
museum, his standing belief that the Museum is at the location written in the note-
book, and the accessible fact that the notebook says the Museum is on 53rd Street; 
but this complicates the explanation unnecessarily. If we must resort to explaining 
Otto’s action this way, then we must also do so for the countless other actions in 
which his notebook is involved; in each of the explanations, there will be an extra 
term involving the notebook. We submit that to explain things this way is to take 
one step too many. It is pointlessly complex, in the same way that it would be point-
lessly complex to explain Inga’s actions in terms of beliefs about her memory. …In 
an explanation, simplicity is power. (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 13–14)
We do not explain Inga’s action in terms of her belief about her own memo-
ry, e.g. that she has stored information about the location of the museum in her 
brain, which she then accesses in order to take action. This would be “pointlessly 
complex”. In normal cases, such as Inga’s, we use our own memory transparently: 
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we do not have to form beliefs about what is stored in our memories. But this is 
also how Clark and Chalmers describe Otto: he is so accustomed to relying on his 
notebook that he uses it transparently. He does not have to reflect on where the 
relevant information is stored; he simply reaches for the notebook. And, all things 
being equal, we should prefer the explanation that is simplest. Thus, because the 
extended mind thesis allows us to give a simpler folk-psychological explanation of 
Otto’s actions it is preferable to the embedded account, which requires us take ad-
ditional explanatory steps (further discussion in Drayson and Clark, forthcoming).
4.2 Usefulness in Theory Selection
One reason to prefer one theory to a rival is its usefulness. As part of a larger dis-
cussion on addiction and responsibility, Levy argues that the extended mind the-
sis is more useful than the rival embedded account insofar as it enables us to bet-
ter control ourselves (Levy 2007a: 220). He argues that research on ego-depletion 
suggests that addicts have depleted self-control and thus they experience more 
difficulty in resisting their cravings than one who craves but is not addicted. Levy 
suggests that “[i]t may be literally impossible for the addict to refrain from taking 
their drug… when it is immediately available and their self-control resources are 
depleted.” (Levy 2007a: 219). Nevertheless, he maintains that there are some things 
that addicts can do both in the short and the long-term to overcome their addic-
tion—namely, they can take steps to control their environment. 
 According to Levy, the traditional view that the brain wholly constitutes the 
mind (what we’ve called intracranialism) works against those suffering from addic-
tion. This view promotes the idea that the only way for one to recover is to change 
their mind—that is, their brain. In other words, addiction is entirely a matter of 
“will-power” and the addict needs to just “say no” to their cravings (Levy 2007a: 
219–220). Levy argues “[t]o the extent to which we promote the view that giving 
up a drug, whether it is tobacco or heroin, is all a matter of “will-power,” we direct 
them away from the kinds of environmental modifications they need to make if 
they are to regain control.” (Levy 2007a: 220) Thus, Levy reasons that the extend-
ed mind view is more useful in so far as it enables us to better control our own be-
havior, as well as the behavior of others. We should prefer the theory of the mind 
that yields the most successful strategies with respect to repairing our minds, Levy 
argues, and thus the “real-world success” of the extended mind thesis is evidence 
of its truth. He explains, “[k]nowledge is power: if the [extended mind] hypoth-
esis were false, then it would not yield successful strategies.” (ibid.) The stronger 
constitutive claim that the extended mind makes insists that the just “say no” view 
about addiction must be rejected. 
I think the usefulness of the extended view over the embedded view in this con-
text might be debated. Both accounts point us to the agent’s wider environment, 
beyond the brain, in order to fully explain the agent’s decisions and reasoning. So 
perhaps the constitutive claim is not necessary. Thus, this reason on its own may 
not be sufficient for preferring the extended view to the embedded view—it is also 
not obvious that Levy intends it to be. But if we accept Levy’s point, then the use-
fulness of the extended account gives one reason (even if not an indefeasible one) 
to prefer it to the competing theory.
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4.3 Explanatory Power in Theory Selection
I argue that the embedded view suffers from explanatory impotence, while the ex-
tended mind thesis has explanatory power and that this gives us reason to prefer 
the latter to the former. Explanatory power refers to the ability of a theory to ef-
fectively explain phenomena that pertain to its subject matter. Consider an exam-
ple from Drayson and Clark (forthcoming) of a sub-population of inner-city Alz-
heimer’s sufferers in St. Louis who scored dismally on standard tests, such as the 
Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease (CERAD) protocol. 
Based on their test scores, the patients should have been living in full-care hospi-
tals. Yet, they were able to cope with the demands of daily life and to successfully 
live alone in the city. The patients puzzled doctors and Alzheimer specialists. After 
visiting their homes, however, it was revealed that they had transformed their living 
environments with many personalized cognitive tools, props, and aids: from mes-
sage centers, open notes about what to do and when, to labels and pictures on the 
walls, including labelled photos of family and close friends, and ‘memory books’ 
that recorded new events, meetings, and plans. Some had open storage spaces that 
kept crucial items, e.g. kitchen tools or chequebooks, visible, rather than requiring 
memory of where these things were kept.
The problem is that the standard tests for Alzheimer’s disease rest on the as-
sumption of intracranialism: they only evaluate one’s internal memory. The ex-
tended mind thesis is able to explain how these patients continued to effectively 
function in the world. While the (likely implicit) assumption of intracranialism left 
experts confused about how to explain this phenomenon. 
What is more, if we took the tests of internal memory as the only standard, 
these patients would have likely been forcefully removed from their homes and 
re-located to controlled hospital settings much sooner than might be necessary. 
Drayson and Clark point out that the re-location of Alzheimer’s patients is often 
a fateful turning point in which their conditions become more severe. On the ex-
tended view this is explained by the fact that this kind of re-location is on par with 
the infliction of new brain damage upon the patients: in one fell swoop it removes 
them from the cognitive tools, props, and aids which were supporting their intra-
cranial cognitive capacities. The embedded view, on the other hand, struggles to 
explain why the change in environment so often leads to a dramatic degradation 
in the condition of Alzheimer’s patients. 
In this section I have pointed to three preferable characteristics of the extended 
mind view—simplicity, usefulness, and explanatory power—that together provide 
us a basis for preferring it to the competing embedded view of the mind. In the 
next section I consider several ethical reasons for preferring the extended account. 
5. Ethical Reasons for Preferring the Extended Mind Thesis
In this section I discuss three ethical reasons that have been put forth for preferring 
the extended account. First, that the extended mind thesis better protects against 
harm to the mind. Second, that it better accounts for compensatory rehabilitation 
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as a way of repairing the mind. And third, that it better addresses concerns about 
the way we assess the capacities of learning disabled individuals.
5.1 Protection of the Mind
Adopting the extended mind thesis can help us better protect our minds from harm. 
Levy (2007a, b), for example, argues that insofar as we view the tools and technol-
ogies we use as a part of the mind, we are more likely to protect those tools from 
being harmed or removed, in just the way we protect the biological agent, especially 
the brain, from harm. Levy advances the ‘Ethical Parity Principle’ (EPP) to capture 
this idea. His principle is meant to complement Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) orig-
inal parity principle. In its strongest form, EPP is stated as follows:
EPP (strong): Since the mind extends into the external environment alterations of 
external props used for thinking are (ceteris paribus) ethically on par with alterations 
of the brain. (Levy 2007a: 61)
According to this principle, any alteration or harm to external cognitive tools 
should be treated as ethically equivalent to alterations of internal cognitive tools—
namely, the brain. Stealing Otto’s notebook would be morally wrong insofar as it 
would be theft. But, according to EPP we should view this action as much worse 
than that, ethically speaking, precisely because the notebook plays an import-
ant role in Otto’s cognitive life. The notebook stores important information that 
Otto regularly relies on: it contains his memories, his beliefs, and so on. Thus, the 
notebook has a cognitive status, and moral status, equivalent to Otto’s brain. For 
this reason, stealing Otto’s notebook would be more on par with kicking Otto in 
the head, causing him serious cognitive damage, than it would be to stealing some 
property, like his gym bag. According to EPP, we should view theft of a cognitive 
tool much more seriously than theft of property more generally. 
Blitz (2010) argues for a legal parity principle, which maintains that when ex-
ternal processes are functionally equivalent to internal cognitive ones we should 
also treat them as legally equivalent. On his view, the law should protect our cog-
nitive tools from harmful alterations in just the way that it has protected our brains 
against harm. Just as we have helmet laws that mandate protective devices for our 
brains, for example, we should also have protections against kinds of external cog-
nitive damage.
As before, we might take the “real-world success” of the extended mind thesis 
to better protect our minds from harm as evidence of its truth. However, although 
Levy (2007a) endorses the extended mind thesis, he concedes that the defender of 
the embedded mind is able to offer equal protections of the mind. The embedded 
mind theorist might reject the strong version of EPP, but she could account for 
ethical parity with a weaker principle:
EPP (weak): Alteration of external props are (ceteris paribus) ethically on par with 
alterations of the brain, to the precise extent to which our reasons for finding alter-
ations of the brain problematic are transferable to alterations of the environment 
in which it is embedded. (Levy 2007a: 61)
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The weaker version of the principle maintains that alterations to external cog-
nitive tools are ethically on par with alterations to the brain only insofar as the rea-
sons we have for objecting to the latter are applicable to the former. According to 
Levy, weak EPP would allow the defender of the embedded account to offer equal 
protections to external cognitive tools without conceding the stronger claim that 
external props are actually partly constitutive the mind. Weak EPP still requires that 
we treat interventions and alterations to internal (brain) and external operations 
on a par, unless we can find ethically relevant reasons for drawing a distinction be-
tween them. Thus, according to Levy, appealing to protecting the mind does not 
itself establish sufficient normative reasons for preferring the extended mind to the 
embedded mind, precisely because both frameworks offer equal protections. Sim-
ply recognizing the importance of external resources for cognition, as the embed-
ded theory does, is sufficient to establish the same protections (King 2016: 47–50). 
5.2 Cognitive Rehabilitation: Repairing the Mind
Drayson and Clark try to respond to Levy’s claim that the embedded mind would 
offer the same protections and would have the same ethical implications more gen-
erally as the extended mind thesis. They argue that the extended mind thesis has 
more significant ethical implications than the embedded view, focusing on how 
these views offer differing accounts of the cognitive rehabilitation of neuroatypi-
cal individuals and of our understanding of cognitive impairment. 
Cognitive rehabilitation refers to the process of improving an individual’s im-
paired ability to process and use information. Drayson and Clark explain that there 
are two dominant strategies of cognitive rehabilitation: restorative and compensa-
tory. Restorative strategies aim at restoring the damaged neural area or circuits. 
Compensatory strategies, on the other hand, aim to achieve the same functional 
results as restorative strategies but in different ways, for example, by using photos 
or labels to assist memory. This typically involves adaptive strategies that rely on 
both internal and external resources to improve information processing and use. 
Some neuroscientists favor restorative strategies and view compensatory strategies 
only as a recourse, necessary because of our limited understanding of and access 
to the brain. On this view, as neuroscience advances, compensatory strategies will 
eventually be replaced in favor of restorative ones. Thus, while compensatory re-
habilitation can be an effective substitute for neural restoration, it does not truly 
restore the mind—only repairing the damaged or affected neural areas can restore 
the mind. This follows from what I will call the principle of intracranialism, which 
holds that neural activity entirely determines mental activity (from King 2016: 55.) 
Given its commitment to the position of intracranialism, the embedded account is 
committed to this principle, while the extended account rejects it. And it follows 
from the principle of intracranialism that only by restoring neural activity can we 
restore mental activity.
As a result, Drayson and Clark argue that the extended mind thesis and the 
embedded mind thesis take different positions on rehabilitative strategies. Due to 
her intracranialist commitment, the embedded mind theorist must maintain that 
compensatory strategies cannot achieve true restoration of mental function. So she 
must maintain a distinction between restorative and compensatory rehabilitation: if 
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the mind is realized only by neurons, then the only way to repair a damaged mind 
is to repair the neural areas that bring it about. The extended mind thesis, on the 
other hand, offers a different picture. It allows us to view compensatory strategies 
as on par with restorative ones. For the extended mind theorist, both strategies 
are legitimate ways of repairing cognitive ability—neither is a second-best option. 
The oddity of what the embedded mind view is committed to in maintaining 
the traditional distinction between restoration and compensation is brought out 
by an example that Clark gives (in response to Jerry Fodor’s (2009) critique of the 
extended mind thesis):
[I]magine a case in which a person (call her Diva) suffers minor brain damage and 
loses the ability to perform a simple task of arithmetic division using only her neural 
resources. An external silicon circuit is added that restores the previous functional-
ity. Diva can now divide just as before, only some small part of the work is distrib-
uted across the brain and the silicon circuit: a genuinely mental process (division) is 
supported by a hybrid biotechnological system… (Clark 2009)
In this case Diva’s damaged neural circuit has been restored with silicon-based 
functional replacements of neurons. But, if one maintains the traditional distinc-
tion between restoration and compensation, not even this would count as true 
restoration. If neurons alone can constitute cognition, then even this rehabilita-
tive strategy falls short of true restoration. Even though Diva’s doctors have ad-
dressed the structural integrity of her neural circuits they have had to rely on sil-
icon structures, rather than biological structures, to do so and thus this has to be 
seen as merely compensatory. So, while the extended mind theorist can describe 
Diva’s rehabilitative strategy as truly restoring her cognitive functioning, the em-
bedded mind theorist cannot. 
As another example, consider again the Alzheimer’s patients discussed before. 
These patients developed their own compensatory strategies that allowed them to 
live successful lives despite their impaired intracranial functioning. The extend-
ed mind thesis allows us to see the compensatory strategies developed by these 
patients as genuinely restoring their cognitive functioning. It offers a new way of 
conceptualizing the distinction between restoration and compensation, suggest-
ing that we should evaluate rehabilitation based on the functional capacities of the 
extended cognitive system, rather than restricting cases of “true” rehabilitation to 
only those that involve restored neural circuits. 
Drayson and Clark’s argument also offers a response to Levy’s view that the em-
bedded mind thesis has the same ethical implications and affords the same protec-
tions of the mind as the extended mind thesis. Drayson and Clark argue that if we 
view the cognitive tools and aids of the cognitively impaired as mere scaffolding, 
rather than as legitimately a part of their minds, we are less likely to protect those 
tools from harm in the same way that we protect the biological brain from harm. 
On the extended mind view, the minds of people who rely on external tools are 
more vulnerable to harm than those who do not rely as heavily on them precisely 
because the dominant intracranialist view of the mind has failed to recognize and 
protect those tools. Thus, resisting the extended mind thesis may lead us to ne-
glect what ought to be protected and, as a result, place cognitively impaired peo-
ple in greater danger of cognitive harm (further discussion in King 2016: 46–48). 
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5.3 Capacities of Learning Disabled Individuals: Improving the Mind
Finally, King (2016) offers yet another reason to favor the extended account: that 
adopting the embedded account commits one to problematic views about the cogni-
tive capabilities of learning disabled individuals, while the extended account avoids 
these commitments. Researchers working on learning disabilities draw a distinc-
tion between two kinds of strategies aimed at addressing learning that, according 
to King, roughly maps on to the distinction between restorative and compensato-
ry strategies discussed in the previous section. Researchers of learning disabilities 
distinguish between “remedial” strategies and compensatory strategies (e.g., Gar-
ner and Campbell 1987). Remedial strategies aim to directly address a learning-dis-
abled individual’s impairment by improving their ability to perform tasks in just 
the same way that a non-disabled individual would (King 2016: 54). Compensatory 
strategies, on the other hand, attempt to circumvent learning impairment by helping 
the individual perform the same tasks by using assistive technologies (ibid). King 
argues that remedial strategies are analogous to restorative strategies in cognitive 
rehabilitation and (again, because of the commitment to intracranialism) the em-
bedded mind theorist has to say that remedial strategies are the only “true” way to 
enhance a learning-disabled person’s cognitive capabilities. Compensatory strate-
gies, as before, are only a second-best option, employed when remedial strategies 
are not possible: they might help an individual compensate for her impairment but 
they do not restore cognitive capacities. The extended mind theorist, on the other 
hand, can view both strategies as genuinely restoring cognitive capabilities. 
To bring out this difference, King describes a “paradigm case” of a learning 
disabled person who uses assistive technologies as a compensatory strategy for 
her disability:
Consider someone with a learning disability, Dana, who requires a graphic organizer 
of potential decisions in order to evaluate which decision is best. In this example, let 
us imagine that Dana has a very difficult time comparing the relevant factors when 
she must evaluate them solely “in her head,” but when allowed to create and utilize a 
visual diagram of the various possibilities, her decision making skills are just as good 
as anyone’s. In this case, she needs a particular physical configuration of informa-
tion in order to be able to perform a cognitive process like comparing and choosing 
among potential courses of action, and without the aid of these external resources, it 
would appear that she is incapable of performing this cognitive action. (King 2016: 49)
According to King, environmental tools, such as graphic organizers (i.e. visuo-
spatial ways of representing information such as cognitive maps, venn diagrams, 
flowcharts) are typically employed as assistive technologies in compensatory strate-
gies for learning, problem solving, and planning, for example. The embedded mind 
thesis would say that Dana couldn’t make complex decisions. King argues that we 
should resist this conclusion. Dana may need to rely on graphic organizers, but she 
is quite capable of making complex decisions. She just requires a particular sort of 
environmental scaffolding that a non-learning disabled individual would not. In 
other words, Dana is only unable to make complex decisions when she is denied 
access to the external cognitive aids that she requires (King 2016: 50). Thus, the 
extended account better accommodates our intuitions about learning-disabled in-
dividuals than the embedded account.
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5.3.1 Response from the Embedded Mind Theorist
Is this an accurate portrayal of the embedded mind theory? One might object that 
the embedded mind thesis can allow that compensatory strategies genuinely re-
pair and improve the mind. After all, the embedded mind theorist holds that the 
environment plays a crucial and sometimes indispensable role in supporting cogni-
tion. Thus, just because the embedded mind theorist denies the constitutive claim 
that the extended mind theorist endorses does not mean that she would also resist 
compensatory strategies that make use of assistive technologies (King 2016: 54–55). 
But given the commitment to the principle of intracranialism, the embedded mind 
theorist is committed to an inverse relation between the extent to which an indi-
vidual relies on external tools and the extent to which we ought to say that she, or 
her mind, is really doing x, where x is some cognitive process (ibid.). This means 
that Dana is only “doing” as much, cognitively speaking, as her neurons are doing 
(King 2016: 56). And therefore, she only merits “cognitive credit” for what her neu-
rons do: the cognitive work that is done by whatever assistive devices she employs 
is not being done by her and so she should not get credit for the achievements of 
these devices. King points out that this means that the more heavily integrated as-
sistive devices are—the more one relies on these tools—the less cognizing one is 
actually doing. The embedded mind theorist is, thus, forced to say that Dana has 
less cognitive capacities and deserves less cognitive credit than someone who could 
perform the same task ‘intracranially’. So, the embedded mind thesis really does 
commit one to saying that learning-disabled individuals, such as Dana, who rely 
on assistive technologies are cognitively capable of less than non-disabled learners.
On the extended view we need not draw equivalence between neural capacity 
and cognitive capacity, and, thus, diminished neural capacity does not entail di-
minished cognitive capacity. This means that compensatory strategies are not just 
acceptable (as the embedded mind theorist would also accept them), but they are 
equally legitimate ways of improving and repairing cognitive capacities as restor-
ative strategies are (ibid.). King argues that the extended view better captures our 
intuitions about learning disabled individuals: “[a]ssistive technologies are tools 
that help [learning-disabled] individuals do more, not less” (King 2016: 57). But 
furthermore, citing various testimonial reports, she also argues that the extended 
view better captures how learning-disabled individuals view themselves and their 
own relationship to the assistive technologies that they use:
[Learning-disabled] individuals who have consistent access to assistive technologies 
in the classroom report feeling less anxious, more independent, and more confident 
in their own abilities (Day and Edwards 1996). Rather than making them feel as if 
the more they use technologies, the less they can do “themselves” (the picture of 
cognitive capability that the embedded thesis predicts), well-assisted [learning-dis-
abled] individuals report feeling as if they are capable of doing more, and with an 
increased sense of independence and self- reliance. Testimonial reports of the im-
pact of access to assistive technology on [learning-disabled] individuals’ self-concept 
further supports the suggestion that [learning-disabled] individuals see themselves 
in this way. (King 2016: 57).
While this is hardly an indefeasible reason to favor the extended view, the 
first-person accounts from learning-disabled individuals do seem to align with our 
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own intuitions that assistive technologies help them to become better at process-
ing information and using information.
The embedded mind defender might also maintain that Dana’s graphic organiz-
er helps her arrive at better decisions than had she not used the device. But, there 
is a key difference between what, precisely, the two accounts mean when they say 
that the technology allows Dana to “do more”: the embedded view would say that 
the graphic organizer enables Dana to achieve more qua competent tool user, while 
the extended view asserts that the graphic organizer allows Dana to do more qua 
cognizer (ibid). King uses the analogy of a runner who would fatigue after just a few 
miles when running barefoot but when given a pair of quality running shoes (an 
assistive device) could run for significantly longer distances and at greater speeds. 
The shoes could be seen as merely an assistive technology—a “tool” for running—
but what we want to say, and what we are more likely to say, is that their use im-
proved the runner’s abilities qua runner (King 2016: 60). Likewise, the extended 
thesis views the cognitive agent and the tool as a single (wide or extended) sys-
tem: it draws no divide between the agent and the tool, while the embedded thesis 
would have to attribute any increased capabilities that result from the tool-use to 
the tool itself rather than the individual. Because the embedded theorist clings to 
intracranialism, she must insist on a clear distinction between the cognitive capac-
ities of the agent and the non-cognitive capacities of the tool (King 2016: 59–60). 
King’s argument suggests that while the extended mind thesis might seem radical 
and less intuitive, on a closer analysis of how the view explains rehabilitation strat-
egies employed by learning-disabled individuals it seems it is the embedded thesis 
that struggles to accommodate our intuitions about the use of assistive technol-
ogies. Furthermore, the embedded view must reject the beliefs that learning-dis-
abled individuals self-report about their own relationships to their assistive devices. 
I conclude that King’s argument offers another normative reason to prefer the 
extended account. The ethical reasons discussed in this section should also serve 
as caution that our biological capacities should not condition our notions of reha-
bilitation, well-being, or decision-making, at the risk of alienating, marginalizing, 
and even harming those who rely on technologies for their cognition. The picture 
that I hope emerges from this paper is that technology can, and often does, allow 
our minds to transcend our biological capacities.
6. Conclusion
The debate between the embedded and the extended mind views has seemed to 
reach a stalemate. Is the mind merely embedded in the world, coupled to the var-
ious tools that it uses, or is it partly constituted by these tools? And what hinges 
on this? Insofar as one agrees that we have reached a stalemate, I have argued that 
there are normative reasons that we can appeal to that make that extended mind 
thesis preferable to the embedded mind thesis. First, in terms of choosing between 
these views as two scientific theories of the mind, we can appeal to various norms 
of theory selection. I have argued that the extended mind thesis has three virtues—
simplicity, usefulness, and explanatory power—that make it preferable to the em-
bedded mind view. Second, looking at the ethical import of these views, I argue that 
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there are again good reasons to prefer the extended mind thesis: it better protects 
against harm to the mind, it better accounts for how we repair the mind, and finally, 
it offers a better assessment of the capacities of learning disabled individuals. While 
some of these are not on their own decisive reasons to prefer one view to the other, 
I believe that taken together, they provide good reason for preferring the extended 
view. Thus, taken as a whole these reasons can be used as a response to the cou-
pling-constitution deadlock. We should, I argue, view external tools as enabling us 
to transcend our biological capacities: our minds are extended, not just embedded. 
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Prevazilaženje zastoja: naučni i etički razlozi  
za prihvatanje teze o proširenom duhu
Apstrakt
Prema tezi o proširenom duhu iako se naši umovi prevashodno nalaze u našem mozgu i telu, 
njih ponekad delimično ustanovljuju delovi naše sredine. Kritičari tvrde da nemamo razloga 
da od teze da je naša kognicija uronjena u našu sredinu napravimo korak ka prihvatanju jače 
teze prema kojoj je naša kognicija konstituisana našom sredinom. U ovom radu, pokazujem 
da postoje normativni razlozi, naučni i etički, da prihvatimo tezu o proširenom duhu umesto 
suparničke, uronjene, teze.
Ključne reči: proširena kognicija, intrakranializam, uzglobljen duh, etika, selekcija teorija, ko-
gnitivna rehabilitacija
